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GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: UNDERMINING THE
LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE'S ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE
HARSHER PENALTIES FOR CHILD DEATHS




A child's death is always a tragic event, but even more so when that
death is the result of parental abuse or neglect. In an investigative series by
The Denver Post, writers Karen Auge and Kirk Mitchell explored the ap-
parent inequity of the relatively shorter sentences meted out to adults who
kill a child through abuse or neglect.1 One of the main problems with such
prosecutions is proving the element of intent; that is, determining the
adult's state of mind when he or she abused or neglected the child.2 Often,
differentiating between a momentary lapse in judgment and willful or in-
tentional abusive behavior can be difficult, muddying the waters when it
comes time to present such a case to a jury.3
In Louisiana, however, the Legislature provided a way of allowing
harsh sentences for adults who kill children in the commission of abuse or
neglect by significantly lessening the requisite intent needed to prosecute
such a case as a murder.4 By including child abuse offenses in the list of
felonies that can be used as a basis for a felony murder prosecution, the
Louisiana Legislature made it possible to prosecute adults for murder
when their abuse or neglect causes a child's death.' As explained in this
Note, the Louisiana Supreme Court has significantly limited the scope of
this law by its decision that the felony murder statute cannot be used to
prosecute a parent when a child dies due to the parent's failure to super-
vise.6 The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in this case undermines the
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4. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A)(2) (2014).
5. Id.
6. See State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797.
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Legislature's prerogative to toughen the state's stance on abusive or neg-
lectful behavior resulting in child deaths and deprecates the seriousness of
parental failure to supervise despite the dire consequences for the victims.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 20, 2008, Caddo Parish resident Satonia Small left her
apartment around 10:00 p.m. to go drinking with a friend, leaving her two
small children unattended. 7 While six-year-old S.S.8 and seven-year-old
J.D. were alone, a fire broke out on a stove burner in the kitchen.9 J.D.
escaped the burning apartment by jumping from a second-story window.10
A Shreveport Fire Department captain later found S.S. in the apartment
and carried her out of the blaze." S.S. was not breathing when she was
rescued.1 2 Small learned about the fire from a neighbor, and she arrived
back at the apartment complex after her daughter was taken to the hospi-
tal.13 A Shreveport police officer on the scene advised Small of her Mi-
randa rights and took her to the police department. 4 On January 29, 2008,
S.S. was removed from the ventilator and died of "anoxic encephalopathy
with pneumonia and complicating smoke and soot inhalation."' 5 Small was
indicted for one count of second-degree murder on March 18, 2008.16
Before this incident, Small pleaded guilty to criminal abandonment in
connection with a December 2006 offense.17 The officer who investigated
that offense found the children alone in Small's home, which he described
as "unhealthy" and "deplorable."'" The State filed a notice of intent to
introduce the previous guilty plea during Small's murder trial on Novem-
ber 10, 2008.19 The trial court granted the State's request to admit that
guilty plea and the accompanying colloquy, in which Small told the court
that she would never leave her children alone again.20
Small's trial began on August 25, 2010.21 At trial, the State contended
that Small's history of neglect showed that this incident was more than just
a momentary lapse in judgment.22 The State also argued that Small could
have safely evacuated her children had she been present when the fire
broke out.23 Small's defense was that the fire was unforeseeable and that
7. Id. at 799.
8. The Court refers to juvenile victims by their initials to preserve their privacy.
9. Small, 100 So. 3d at 799.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 800.
12. Id. at 801.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 799, 802.
16. Id. at 800.
17. Id.; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:79.1 (2014).




22. Id. at 802.
23. Id.
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she could only be guilty of negligent homicide for failing to supervise her
children, not second-degree murder.24 However, the State countered that a
negligent homicide conviction would be inappropriate given the defen-
dant's history of neglect. 5 The jury unanimously convicted Small of sec-
ond-degree murder on August 26, 2010, declining to convict her on the
lesser-included offenses of manslaughter or negligent homicide. 6
The trial court held a hearing on Small's motion for post-verdict judg-
ment of acquittal or for judgment of conviction of negligent homicide on
September 20, 2010.27 Small claimed that she could not be convicted under
Louisiana's felony murder statute when her actions only proximately
caused the victim's death; that is, the prosecution failed to establish a "di-
rect causal link between her [act of] leaving the children unattended and
the accidental fire."2 The trial court denied Small's motion on September
30, 2010, and she was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. 29 Small appealed after the trial court denied her motion to recon-
sider sentence filed on October 7, 2010.10
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit affirmed
Small's conviction, finding that leaving her small children alone constituted
criminally negligent neglect, which ultimately caused S.S.'s death.31 The
court rejected Small's argument that Louisiana's felony murder statute was
unconstitutionally vague because it did not contain a causation require-
ment.32 The court also reasoned that cruelty to juveniles is felonious and
dangerous to the life and well-being of children, and, as such, it can be used
as the underlying felony in a felony murder case.33 While Small's offense
could have been prosecuted under several statutes, the prosecutor was free
to pursue the case under any applicable statute.34
The court also rejected Small's claim that evidence from her previous
conviction was improperly admitted. The court found that the trial court
did not err in admitting the colloquy from Small's prior guilty plea and
items of photographic evidence from Small's previous criminal neglect con-
viction.36 These items of evidence showed that Small's failure to supervise
was not just an isolated incident.37 Small also argued on appeal that a life
sentence was unconstitutionally excessive based on the facts of her case.38
24. Id.
25. Id.





31. State v. Small, 46, 632 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11116/11); 78 So. 3d 825, 831-32.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.: see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:4 (2014).
35. Small, 78 So. 3d at 832-33.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 833-34.
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The court rejected this argument given Small's prior abandonment convic-
tion and the extreme facts and circumstances of this case. 39 The Louisiana
Supreme Court subsequently granted Small's writ application to determine
whether the neglect that ultimately killed Small's daughter supported a
conviction of second-degree murder under the felony murder rule.4 ° The
court ruled that it did not and reversed Small's conviction, ordering the
trial court to resentence the defendant under the negligent homicide
statute.4'
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
In order to frame the discussion about the court's refusal to apply
Louisiana's felony murder rule when the underlying felony is cruelty to
juveniles due to a parent's failure to supervise, a review of the felony mur-
der rule in general and as applied in Louisiana is appropriate. After ex-
ploring the felony murder rule, this section will examine when it is
appropriate to impose criminal responsibility for an individual's failure to
act-such as failing to supervise children-when that act results in criminal
consequences. Also, this section will briefly discuss the Louisiana Legisla-
ture's sole authority to define criminal activity and prescribe criminal pen-
alties. Analyzing the case in light of the law described below will show that
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Small reached an erroneous result by mis-
applying Louisiana's felony murder rule agency limitation and by overstep-
ping the Legislature's decision to allow a felony murder prosecution when
a child dies from a parent's failure to supervise.
A. The Felony Murder Rule
At common law, the felony murder rule allowed an individual to be
guilty of murder when he or she kills another human being during the com-
mission of any felony.42 Thus, the malice normally required to constitute a
murder is provided by the law and inferred from the guilty state of mind
present in the underlying felony.43 This essentially relieves the state of the
burden of proving that a defendant possessed the state of mind usually
required to elevate a homicide to a murder." The following section exam-
ines the origin of the felony murder rule, the limitations that many jurisdic-
tions place on its application, and the application of the felony murder rule
in Louisiana.
39. Id.
40. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 805.
41. Id. at 815; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32(A)(1) (2014).
42. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that
Shape our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1994).
43. 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 147 (15th ed.. West 2013); Walter Dickey, et al., The Impor-
tance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1323, 1365 (1989).
44. Tomkovicz, supra note 42, at 1436-37.
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1. Origins of the Felony Murder Rule
Although the felony murder rule is deeply founded in the history of
criminal law, its origin is uncertain.4" Some scholars claim that the rule
dates back to the Sixteenth Century, originating in Lord Dacre's Case or
Mansell and Hebert's Case.46 Other sources place the origin much later; by
Lord Coke in 1644, or by Sir Michael Foster in 1762.4v Since then, scholars
have criticized the rule as circumventing the notion of mens rea, one of the
most fundamental precepts of the modern criminal justice system.48 De-
spite these long-enduring criticisms, the details of which are outside the
scope of this Note, the felony murder rule ultimately found its way from
England into the American legal system.49
2. Limiting the Felony Murder Rule
The felony murder rule in its original form encompassed the killing of
a human being in the commission of any felonious act.50 There were far
fewer felonies at common law than under modern penal codes, so United
States jurisdictions have limited the scope of the felony murder rule to
avoid disproportionate punishments for crimes that are technically felonies
but do not pose a danger to human life.5" Great Britain-where the felony
murder rule originated-abolished the rule in 1957.52 Only three states-
Ohio, 3 Kentucky, 4 and Hawaii 5 -have eliminated the rule. 6 The re-
maining states have retained the felony murder rule but have limited its
scope.57
Different states have approached limiting the felony murder rule in
different ways.5' Generally, states have restricted the felony murder rule
by applying it only to certain felonies, by requiring a "more strict interpre-
tation of the requirement of proximate ... cause," by restricting the span of
time that constitutes the commission of the felony, or "by requiring the
underlying felony to be independent of the homicide."5 9 In Louisiana, the
felony murder rule limits the scope of the rule to apply only to certain
45. Id. at 1429.
46. Id. at 1442-43.
47. Id. at 1442.
48. Id. at 1448.
49. Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
50, 59 (1956).
50. Dickey, supra note 43, at 1365-66.
51. Id. at 1365.
52. Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1 (1957) (U.K.); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312
(Mich. 1980).
53. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(A) (West 2013) (making a killing that occurs in the com-
mission of a felony involuntary manslaughter instead of murder).
54. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West 2013).
55. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-701 (West 2013).
56. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 314-15.
57. Id. at 312-14.
58. Id.
59. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5 (2d ed. 2013).
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felonies enumerated by the state Legislature and by requiring the perpetra-
tor of the killing to be the perpetrator of the underlying felony or one in
agency with the perpetrator of the underlying felony.60 This agency limita-
tion is the subject of this Note and is discussed in more detail below.
3. The Evolution of the Felony Murder Rule in Louisiana
In the late Eighteenth Century, when many states adopted the Com-
mon Law of England in conjunction with or in lieu of their own criminal
statutes, the felony murder rule followed.61 While many states eventually
codified the felony murder rule, some states left it up to the courts to de-
fine homicide.62 Louisiana was one of the states to adopt the common law
definition of homicide after rescinding its grading statute in 1855.63 Grad-
ing statutes, or felony aggravator statutes, allowed a homicide to be up-
graded to first-degree murder if the killing occurred in the commission of
an aggravating felony.64 Although this concept may sound similar to the
felony murder rule, grading statutes did not eliminate the requirement of
mens rea, but considered the underlying felony as an aggravating factor
sufficient to elevate the charge to first-degree murder.65 Thus, determining
exactly how to define the crime of murder was largely left to the courts
even when grading statutes were in effect.6 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, did not recognize a felony
murder rule per se until its decision in State v. Deschamps in 1890.67 In
Deschamps, the defendant drugged the victim so he could have sexual in-
tercourse with her.68 The victim then died from an overdose of the drugs,
and the defendant was found guilty of murder.69 On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the jury should have been instructed that if the killing was a
result of the defendant's gross negligence, but not premeditation, that he
should be guilty of manslaughter and not murder.7" The court rejected the
claim, stating that "proof of the commission of such contemporaneous
crime ... would be accepted as sufficient proof of malice."71 This appears
60. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2014) (listing the enumerated felonies to which the fel-
ony murder rule can apply); State v. Myers, 1999-1849 (La. 4/11/00); 760 So. 2d 310, 315.
61. Guorya Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59. 113, 123
(2004).
62. Id. at 139.
63. Id. Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, but common law ingredients influenced Louisiana's
criminal law since 1805, beginning with the adoption of the Crimes Act of 1805. J. Denson Smith, The
Louisiana Criminal Code (Its Background and General Plan), 5 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1942). The Act
merely listed criminal offenses and "construed [them] in conformity with the common law of England."
Id. Louisiana subsequently abandoned this method, and the Legislature gradually built a more compre-
hensive criminal code. Id.
64. Binder, supra note 61, at 141.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 139 (citing State v. Deschamps, 7 So. 703, 704-05 (La. 1890)).
68. Deschamps, 7 So. at 704-05.
69. Id. at 703, 705.
70. Id. at 704-05.
71. Id. at 705.
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to be the first statement of the felony murder rule in Louisiana
jurisprudence.72
Today, the felony murder rule is embodied in Louisiana's second-de-
gree murder statute.73 The statute reads in pertinent part:
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being ....
When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, ag-
gravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape,
assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree
robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to
juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism,
even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm.
The current felony murder statute limits the application of the felony
murder rule to those enumerated felonies, and that list has grown over the
years. Prior to 1987, the list of eligible felonies was limited to "aggravated
rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery. ' 75 In 1987, the Legisla-
ture added forcible rape and first-degree robbery to the list. 76 Drive-by
shooting was added in 1993.77 Second-degree kidnapping and cruelty to
juveniles were added in 1997.78 Second-degree robbery and second-degree
cruelty to juveniles were added in 2006.71 Of the listed felonies, only cru-
elty to juveniles and second-degree cruelty to juveniles can be committed
either by overt acts or by failing to act.80 Cruelty to juveniles is defined as:
[t]he intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or
neglect by anyone seventeen years of age or older of any
child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain
or suffering is caused to said child. Lack of knowledge of the
child's age shall not be a defense.8'
Since their addition in 1997 and 2006 respectively, virtually no Louisi-
ana cases have addressed whether cruelty to juveniles can serve a basis for
a felony murder conviction when a parent's failure to supervise leads to the
72. Binder, supra note 61, at 139.
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A)(2) (2014).
74. Id.
75. 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 653 (West).
76. Id.
77. 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. 496 (West).
78. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 563 (West); 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 899 (West).
79. 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 53 (West).
80. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 809-10.
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
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child's death.8" The Louisiana Supreme Court finally faced that issue, how-
ever, in State v. Small when a house fire claimed a child's life while her
mother was out drinking.
83
B. The Agency Theory as a Limit on the Application of Louisiana's
Felony Murder Rule
There are generally two schools of thought when it comes to deciding
when a defendant can be criminally culpable for murder under the felony
murder rule-the "proximate cause theory" and the "agency theory."8 4
The proximate cause theory, the broader of the two, "attaches felony mur-
der liability for any death proximately resulting from the felony, regardless
of who actually killed the victim."8 5 Therefore, when co-felons commit a
felony and a person is killed by either one of the co-felons-or a by-
stander-each co-felon is liable for the murder under the felony murder
rule as long as the chain of events leading to the killing was "objectively
foreseeable."86
The narrower agency theory-the approach used in Louisiana-re-
stricts criminal liability to killings actually committed by the felon or by a
co-felon.87 Like the proximate cause theory, the agency theory still allows
co-felons to share liability for murder when one of them commits a kill-
ing.88 However, the agency theory does not allow a felon to be liable for
murder under the felony murder rule when a third-party-such as a by-
stander-commits the killing.89 The agency theory is littered throughout
Louisiana's felony murder jurisprudence. 90
The earliest recitation of the agency theory in Louisiana law is in State
v. Garner.9' In Garner, the defendant attacked a bartender with a knife
during a fight at a bar.92 In response, the bartender fired a shot in self-
defense, which missed the defendant but killed a bystander.93 At the time,
Louisiana's Criminal Code allowed a defendant to be guilty of murder:
[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm; or [w]hen the offender is engaged in the
perpetration ... of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary,
82. Small, 100 So. 3d at 810.
83. Id. at 811.
84. James W. Hilliard, Felony Murder in Illinois The "Agency Theory" vs. The "Proximate Cause
Theory": The Debate Continues, 25 S. I11. U. L.J. 331, 332 (2001).
85. Id. at 346.
86. Id. at 332, 346-47.
87. Id. at 345-48; State v. Kalathakis, 563 So. 2d 228, 233 (La. 1990).
88. Hilliard, supra note 84, at 345-48.
89. Id.
90. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 806-07.
91. Id.
92. State v. Garner, 115 So. 2d 855, 857 (La. 1959).
93. Id.
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aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, or
simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill.94
The manslaughter statute 95 encompassed a killing in the commission of any
felony not listed in the above statute.96
When construing the murder and manslaughter statutes in light of the
facts present in Garner, the trial court found that because the killing was
perpetrated by a bystander-and not someone acting in concert with the
defendant in the commission of the felony-the defendant could not be
liable for murder. 97 The trial court stated, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court agreed, that the term "offender" in the murder statute, applied also
to the manslaughter statute and referred to the person who committed the
killing.98 Thus, to be guilty of felony murder the "offender" must commit a
killing while in the perpetration of a felony himself or while acting in
agency with another who is perpetrating a felony. 99 By restricting liability
for murder to a killing committed by a felon or co-felons and excluding
killing committed by third parties, Louisiana essentially adopted the agency
theory of felony murder."'° The Louisiana Supreme Court continued to
apply the agency test in a long line of subsequent cases.10' Two cases-
Kalathakis and Myers-illustrate the Louisiana Supreme Court's adher-
ence to the agency limitation to the felony murder rule.
In State v. Kalathakis, law enforcement officers raided the defendant's
home due to suspected drug activity. 102 During the raid, the defendant's
accomplice fled the house and opened fire, shooting a police officer.
10 3
Other officers returned fire and killed the accomplice. 0 4 The defendant
was convicted of felony manslaughter.10 5 At the time, felony manslaughter
was defined as "a homicide committed, without any intent to cause death
or great bodily harm . . . when the offender is engaged in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration" of a felony not listed in the felony murder stat-
ute.10 6 On appeal, the defendant claimed that under Garner, she could not
be guilty of felony manslaughter for a killing perpetrated by a bystander-
in this case a police officer-and not herself or a co-felon.'07 The appellate
court upheld the conviction, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,
declining to distinguish this case from Garner merely because the victim
94. Id. at 858.
95. Id. at 857-58.
96. Id. at 857.
97. Id. at 864.
98. Id. at 863.
99. See Id.
100. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10116/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 806-07.
101. Id.




106. Id. at 230.
107. Id.
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was a co-felon and not an innocent bystander. 10 8 Thus, the court held fast
to the agency theory as a limit to the application of the felony murder-or
manslaughter-rule."°9
In State v. Myers, the Louisiana Supreme Court again upheld the
agency theory in a similar situation where the defendant's accomplice and a
detective were killed during a drug bust.110 The defendant was convicted
of felony manslaughter in the deaths of both his accomplice and the police
officer.1"' Again, the court read the felony manslaughter statute in light of
the felony murder statute, which only allows liability for murder when the
"offender"-or one who perpetrates the killing-is engaged in a felony or
is acting in concert with others engaged in a felony. 2 Thus, "the statute
defines felony manslaughter to include only those killings committed by
one acting in furtherance of a felony[;] it precludes criminal liability for
deaths that are not at the hands of the defendant or his co-felons. '113
The articulation of the agency theory of felony murder and manslaugh-
ter framed the court's analysis of the issue presented in State v. Small.'14
Not only did the court erroneously apply the agency theory in Small, but it
failed to recognize that criminal responsibility could be imposed not only
for an individual's overt acts, but for an individual's failure to act as well." 5
Failing to supervise children fits the prevailing criteria used to determine
when criminal responsibility will be imposed for an individual's failure to
act.
C. Criminal Responsibility for Failing to Act
Louisiana's own Criminal Code, LaFave's leading treatise on criminal
law, and the Model Penal Code permit the imposition of criminal responsi-
bility for an individual's failure to act under certain circumstances." 6 The
Louisiana Criminal Code defines criminal conduct as:
[a]n act or a failure to act that produces criminal conse-
quences, and which is combined with criminal intent; or [a]
mere act or failure to act that produces criminal conse-
quences, where there is no requirement of criminal intent;
or [c]riminal negligence that produces criminal
consequences. 1 7
108. Id.
109. Id. at 233.
110. State v. Myers, 1999-1849 (La. 4/11/00); 760 So. 2d 310, 312-13.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 315.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 808-09.
115. LAFAVE, supra note 59, at § 6.2.
116. Id.
117. LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 14:8(1)-(3) (2014) (emphasis added).
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Thus, failing to act is explicitly included within Louisiana's own definition
of criminal conduct. The majority of jurisdictions allow criminal responsi-
bility to be imposed for failures to act using one of the following
analyses." 8
LaFave provides an analysis reflecting the views of several jurisdic-
tions on criminalizing failures to act.119 Many murder statutes are written
in a way that does not specifically address whether failing to act resulting in
a death is covered under the statute. 120 However, that does not mean that
murders cannot be committed when a death results from a defendant's fail-
ure to act even when the defendant "does nothing of an affirmative nature
to cause the ... death.",12' Generally, in order for an individual to be held
criminally responsible for a failure to act, however, that individual must (1)
have a duty to act, (2) know that he or she has a duty to act, (3) be able to
perform the act, and (4) the failure to act must cause the death.' The
above analysis has been used in various jurisdictions to determine whether
to impose criminal responsibility when a death results from one's failure to
act.
123
The Model Penal Code contains similar provisions allowing criminal
responsibility to be imposed for an individual's failure to act. 24 The Code
permits a person to be guilty of a criminal offense when he or she commits
a "voluntary act" or an "omission to perform an act of which he is physi-
cally capable."'1 25 The Code goes on to provide, however, that criminal re-
sponsibility may not be imposed for a failure to act unless the failure to act
is "expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or. .. a duty
to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by the law. ''1 26 Further,
apart from it's erroneous application of the agency theory and failure to
recognize that failing to act can have criminal consequences, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Small also intruded on the Legislature's discretion to
define criminal acts by precluding a felony murder prosecution when the
underlying felony is cruelty to juveniles based on failure to supervise.
D. Louisiana's Legislature Alone May Define Criminal Acts
Louisiana's constitution vests legislative power exclusively within the
purview of the State's Legislature. 27 Louisiana courts have consistently
held that "the determination and definition of acts which are punishable as






124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)-(3) (West 2013).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. LA. CONST. art. II, § 1(A).
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crimes are purely legislative functions."' 8 That function cannot be "dele-
gated to or exercised by the courts of [Louisiana]."' 29 The Louisiana Crim-
inal Code defines a crime as "conduct which is defined as criminal in this
Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or in the constitution of this
state."' 3 °  Thus, Louisiana recognizes no common law crimes, and
"[n]othing is a crime which is not made so by express statute."13' Criminal
conduct is defined as "an act or failure to act that produces criminal conse-
quences, and which is combined with criminal intent; or [a] mere act or
failure to act that produces criminal consequences, where there is no re-
quirement of criminal intent; or [c]riminal negligence that produces crimi-
nal consequences.' 1 32 Likewise, the Code defines criminal consequences
as "any set of consequences prescribed in the various articles of this
Code . . . as necessary to constitute any of the various crimes defined
therein." '33 However, courts have declined to hold criminal defendants
"responsible for remote and indirect consequences which a reasonable per-
son could not have foreseen as likely to have flowed from his conduct or
from those consequences which would have occurred regardless of his
conduct.'
'1 34
Louisiana's criminal statutes are "subject to strict interpretation.,
135 If
the interpretation of a statute is questionable, courts should attempt to de-
termine the Legislature's intent behind the statute.136 However, statutory
construction is not necessary when "the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning.' 1 37 In light of the
rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court has held that "a penal statute cannot be extended to cases not
included within the clear and unmistakable import of its language.'
138
Both legislative intent and revision comments can be reviewed when inter-
preting criminal statutes.' 39 And under the rule of lenity, "criminal statutes
are given a narrow interpretation and any ambiguity in the substantive pro-
visions of a statute as written is resolved in favor of the accused and against
the State.' 40 The principle underlying the rule of lenity is that individuals
cannot be held criminally responsible for an act "unless the law provides a
fair warning of what conduct will be considered criminal.' 14' By ruling that
cruelty to juveniles based on failure to supervise cannot serve as a basis for
128. State v. Anders, 2001-0556 (La. 6/21/02); 820 So. 2d 513, 516 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:7 (2014).
131. State v. Robinson, 78 So. 933, 937 (La. 1918).
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:8.
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:9.
134. State v. Kalathakis, 563 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. 1990).
135. State v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 78 So. 2d 825, 827 (La. 1955).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799, 802 (La. 1975).
139. Id.
140. State v. Cart, 1999-2209 (La. 5/26/00); 761 So. 2d 1271, 1274.
141. Id.
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a felony murder prosecution, the Small court failed to recognize the Louisi-
ana Legislature's role as the sole branch of state government empowered
to define criminal acts.
IV. INSTANT CASE: State v. Small
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Victory
Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey Victory wrote the court's ma-
jority opinion, ruling that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
convict Small of second-degree murder for two reasons.14 First, Justice
Victory found that Small could not be guilty of second-degree murder by
virtue of the felony murder rule embodied in Louisiana Revised Statute
14:30.1(A)(2) because, under the "agency test" adopted in Louisiana, Small
did not commit the requisite "direct act" of killing her daughter by only
failing to supervise.43 And second, Justice Victory found that Small's neg-
lect did not comport with the statutory classification of second-degree mur-
der as a "crime of violence."'1 4 4 Justice Victory thus concluded that the
evidence supported a negligent homicide conviction instead of second-de-
gree murder since, in his view, Small's neglect was an act of negligence.
45
1. The "Agency Test" and the "Direct Act of Killing" Requirement
Justice Victory determined that Small's act of neglect did not amount
to a "direct act" of killing under Louisiana's agency test for determining
whether prosecution under the felony murder rule is appropriate.
146
Under the agency test, either the defendant or an accomplice must commit
a "direct act" that ultimately causes the victim's death.14' This is distinct
from the proximate cause test employed in some jurisdictions, under which
the defendant can be held criminally culpable under the felony murder rule
for "all deaths that foreseeably result from the acts of defendant and co-
felons."' 48 In his agency test analysis, Justice Victory found that the agency
test was not satisfied because the second-degree murder conviction was
based on cruelty to a juvenile, which was based on the defendant's child
neglect. 49 In his view, neglect alone did not constitute a "direct act" which
caused the child's death in the apartment fire. 5 °
While Justice Victory acknowledged the Legislature's ability to include
an offense that only requires "criminal neglect" to serve as a basis for a
felony murder prosecution, he determined that previous felony murder
142. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 818.
143. Id. at 809.
144. Id. at 810.
145. Id. at 812-13.
146. Id. at 809.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 807.
149. Id. at 809.
150. Id.
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convictions involving cruelty to juveniles all involved "direct acts."'' Ex-
amples of those "direct acts" include: malnutrition, 152 hypothermia,1 53 and
physical abuse. 54 In addition, Justice Victory found that second-degree
murder was defined as a "crime of violence. 1 55 In light of these two find-
ings, Justice Victory determined that Small's second-degree murder convic-
tion was based on statutes with "doubtful" interpretations. 156 Thus, Small
was entitled to relief under the rule of lenity, "requiring interpretation of




Although Justice Victory decided that Small could not be guilty of sec-
ond-degree murder under Louisiana's felony murder doctrine, he found
that her actions better fit the crime of negligent homicide.1 58 Unlike sec-
ond-degree murder, "negligent homicide does not require a 'direct act' of
killing by the defendant. '1 59 Rather, negligent homicide fits when the kill-
ing results from the defendant's criminal negligence.1 60 Justice Victory ob-
served that Small's act of neglect-abandoning her small children in the
middle of the night-was the type of "gross deviation below the standard
of care" envisioned in the negligent homicide statute. 61 To be guilty of
negligent homicide, the defendant's act must only be "a substantial factor
in bringing about the forbidden result," in this case, the death of S.S.162
Justice Victory found that the evidence adduced at trial, even viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to "convince a rational trier
of fact that [Small's] neglect was a legal cause of her daughter's death."' 63
But because Small was merely criminally negligent in neglecting her chil-
dren the night of the fire, Justice Victory found-and a majority of the
Court agreed-that Small should be convicted of negligent homicide.' 64
The case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing under the negli-
gent homicide statute, essentially reducing Small's life sentence and expos-
ing her to a prison sentence of only two to five years.
165
151. Id. at 810.
152. Id.; see State v. Woods/State v. Scott, 44, 491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/19/09); 16 So. 3d 1279.
153. See State v. Booker, 2002-1269 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03); 839 So. 2d 455.
154. See State v. Tensley, 41, 726 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/07); 955 So. 2d 227; State v. Miller, 2006-595
(La. App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06); 940 So. 2d 864; State v. Richthofen, 01-500 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/01); 803 So.
2d 171.
155. Small, 100 So. 3d at 809; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:2(B)(3) (2014).
156. Small, 100 So. 3d at 811.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 813.
159. Id. at 811.
160. Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:32.
161. Small, 100 So. 3d at 811-12.
162. Id. at 812 (citing State v. Durio, 371 So. 2d 1158, 1163-64 (La. 1979)).
163. Id. at 813.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 815; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 14:32. The majority opinion in Small also addressed an
evidentiary issue which is outside the scope of this Note and will not be addressed.
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B. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Guidry
Justice Greg G. Guidry, joined by Justice Marcus R. Clark, dissented
to the majority opinion.'66 Guidry disagreed with the majority's determi-
nation that the agency test as articulated in Garner'67 would not allow pros-
ecution under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1(A)(2) when the
defendant's underlying cruelty to juveniles offense was based on "crimi-
nal[ly] negligen[t] lack of supervision."' 68 Justice Guidry wrote that the
agency test comes into play when the victim is killed by a third person.
1 69
He found the instant case distinguishable from the cases the majority cited
because no third party intervened to cause the death of S.S.17
°
The question in Justice Guidry's view became whether Small's act of
neglect amounted to a "contributing cause or substantial factor in the vic-
tim's death.' 171 Justice Guidry found that State v. Matthews 172 and State v.
Durio7 3 established that the State must only show that the defendant's
conduct was a "substantial factor" in the resulting killing.' 74 By contrasting
a case in which the nexus between the act and killing was too tenuous to
justify a felony murder prosecution with cases factually similar to the in-
stant case in which the child's death was "reasonably foreseeable," Justice
Guidry determined that "leaving the child unsupervised for a substantial
period of time was a substantial factor in bringing about the child's death
from consequences of the accidental fire." '175 Thus, the evidence was suffi-
cient, "when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution," for a
jury to determine that Small's act of leaving her child unsupervised
amounted to "the legal cause of the child's ... death.' 76 Further, Justice
Guidry wrote that it was within the Legislature's discretion to include
crimes that can be committed by acts of neglect, like cruelty to juveniles, in
the 1997 amendment to the second-degree murder statute making a death
resulting from child neglect "subject to prosecution for second degree mur-
der" under the felony murder rule. 7 7
V. ANALYSIS
The following section will examine flaws in the court's analysis that led
to an erroneous result-replacing the jury's verdict of guilty of second-de-
gree murder with a conviction on the lesser offense of negligent homi-
cide.77 The court erroneously applied Louisiana's agency theory limitation





171. Id. at 817.
172. State v. Matthews, 450 So. 2d 644, 646 (La. 1984).
173. State v. Durio, 371 So. 2d 1158, 1163-64 (La. 1979).
174. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 816 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 817.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 818.
178. Id. at 815.
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to the felony murder rule based on distinguishable cases. Further, the
court side-stepped the Legislature's power to define criminal activity and
formed an exception to Louisiana's felony murder rule for child deaths re-
sulting from parental neglect creating a problematic public policy and lead-
ing to an absurd result in this case. The following section will explore these
assertions in detail.
A. Blindly Applying the "Agency Test" to This Case Results in an
Absurd Result Which Deprecates the Seriousness of the Offense
The majority claims that felony murder prosecution in this case is pre-
cluded by the court's historical adherence to the agency test to determine
when a killing in the commission of a felony allows a defendant to be held
responsible for murder under the felony murder rule.179 As Justice Guidry
points out in his dissenting opinion, the agency test does not necessarily
apply to the facts of this case. 8 ' The majority even admits that the agency
test is applied "most often when death results from the responses of third
parties."18' Unlike the cases the court relied on for its ruling, there was no
third party intervener who caused the child's death in Small. The death
resulted directly from a parent's failure to supervise her children.
The majority relies primarily on three cases that articulate Louisiana's
reliance on the agency test: Garner,182 Kalathakis,8 3 and Myers.'8 4 Each of
these cases involves killings that were committed by a third person not in
agency with the defendant who committed the underlying felony. In Gar-
ner, the defendant attacked a bartender who fired a shot in self-defense,
which missed the attacker and killed an innocent bystander. 85 The court
found that the defendant could not be held responsible for murder when a
bystander-not a co-felon-fired the fatal shot.'86 Similarly, the defendant
in Kalathakis was not responsible for felony manslaughter when a co-felon
was killed by a police officer during a drug raid on the defendant's home
because the one perpetrating the killing was not a co-felon.187 In Myers,
the defendant was charged with felony manslaughter for the deaths of a co-
felon and a police officer during a drug raid of the defendant's home. 18
The co-felon was shot and killed by a police officer, and a police officer was
shot and killed by the co-felon. 189 Although the defendant was convicted
in the trial court of felony manslaughter for both deaths, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the conviction as to the co-felon's death. 90 The
179. Id. at 806-07.
180. Id. at 816 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 806-07.
182. State v. Garner, 115 So. 2d 855 (La. 1959).
183. State v. Kalathakis, 563 So. 2d 228, 229 (La. 1990).
184. State v. Myers, 1999-1849 (La. 4/11/00); 760 So. 2d 310.
185. Garner, 238 So. 2d at 857.
186. Id. at 864.
187. Kalathakis, 563 So. 2d at 230.
188. Myers, 760 So. 2d at 312-13.
189. Id. at 313.
190. Id. at 315.
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court found the defendant could not be held responsible for the co-felon's
death when it was caused by a police officer and not a co-felon in agency
with the defendant.19'
In Small, the defendant left her six and seven-year-old children alone
in her apartment late at night so she could go drinking with a friend.192
While the children were alone, a fire broke out in the apartment's
kitchen.193 When authorities responded, seven-year-old J.D. had jumped
from a second story window to avoid the blaze, and six-year-old S.S. was
found unconscious in a bedroom.1 94 The defendant-who police said
"smelled strongly of alcohol"-did not arrive back at the apartment until
after S.S. had been sent to the hospital. 95
These facts show that the child's death in Small was caused by the
mother's failure to supervise her children, not by a third party as in the
cases cited by the majority. Even if one of the children did something to
start the fire, it was still a direct result of Small's failure to supervise.
196 If
the defendant had been present in the home, as Justice Guidry notes in his
dissenting opinion, she could have stopped the fire or evacuated the chil-
dren to safety. 9 7 If Small had chosen to supervise her children instead of
abandoning them for a night of fun, S.S. would likely still be alive today.
The application of the agency test in this case is inappropriate because
the defendant's direct act of neglect caused her daughter's death, not the
intervention of a third party. Given her previous conviction of abandon-
ment and acknowledgement of the danger of leaving her children alone,
Small's act of neglect in failing to supervise her children far exceeded crimi-
nal negligence. 198 The fact that Small's failure to supervise her children
likely exceeded criminal negligence makes a negligent homicide conviction
inappropriate. 199 The majority also found, however, that a felony murder
191. Id.
192. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 799.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 801.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 817-18 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
198. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:12 (2014).
199. It should be noted that the jury convicted Small of second-degree murder under the State's
felony murder theory, even when presented with the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and neg-
ligent homicide. Small, 100 So. 3d at 803. Also, Louisiana's Criminal Code defines general intent as
"when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must
have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his ...
failure to act." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:10. While the defendant's intent with regard to the homicide
does not matter in the context of a felony murder prosecution, the Small court seems to suggest that a
second-degree murder prosecution is inappropriate when the defendant has a criminally negligent in-
tent with regard to the underlying felony. Even if this were true, it would not apply in Small, because
Small's intent with regard to cruelty to juveniles by failing to supervise almost certainly exceeded crimi-
nal negligence and reached general intent, given her previous acknowledgment of the dangers of leav-
ing small children unattended.
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conviction was not appropriate because cruelty to juveniles based on fail-
ure to supervise was not in accord with the Legislature's classification of
second-degree murder as a "crime of violence."2 °
B. Cruelty to Juveniles Fits the Legislature's Definition of a "Crime of
Violence" Even Though it Can be Committed
by a Failure to Act
Even though cruelty to juveniles is not contained in the Legislature's
list of enumerated crimes of violence, it still could be considered one. That
list is not exhaustive, and even crimes not listed can be considered crimes
of violence under the statutory definition.2"1 The Small court found that
criminal neglect does not typify the "crime of violence" that the Legislature
envisioned when it included second-degree murder in the list of enumer-
ated "crimes of violence" in Louisiana Revised Statute 14:2(B). 212 The
court stated that:
While neglect can be interpreted to include lack of supervi-
sion, to use cruelty to juveniles statutes to extend second
degree felony murder into the realm of lack of supervision
removes the use of any "physical force" or the "substantial
risk of physical force" that these crimes of violence entail.20 3
Although the only child abuse cases prosecuted as felony murder with
cruelty to juveniles as the underlying felony did involve at least some "di-
rect act of negligence," that merely means the situation presented in Small
is an issue of first impression.20 4 The absence of any cases similar to Small
where a parent's failure to supervise gave rise to the underlying felony used
to prosecute for second-degree murder does not foreclose that possibility.
Perhaps most telling is the Legislature's inclusion of second-degree
cruelty to juveniles in the list of enumerated crimes of violence. 05 Second-
degree cruelty to juveniles can be committed by "intentional or criminally
negligent mistreatment or neglect ... which causes serious bodily injury or
neurological impairment to that child. '2 °6 This definition is almost identi-
cal to cruelty to juveniles, the offense charged in this case.20 7 The only
difference is that in cruelty to juveniles the neglect leads to "unjustifiable
pain or suffering," and in second-degree cruelty to juveniles the neglect
leads to "serious bodily injury or neurological impairment.
20 8
200. Small, 100 So. 3d at 809-10.
201. State v. Oliphant, 2012-1176 (La. 3/19/13); 113 So. 3d 165, 170.
202. Small, 100 So. 3d at 809-810.
203. Id. at 810.
204. Id.
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(B)(38) (2014).
206. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.2.3(A)(1).
207. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93(A)(1) reads in pertinent part: "Cruelty to juveniles is the inten-
tional or criminally negligent mistreatment... whereby unjustifiable pain and suffering is caused to said
child."
208. Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.2.3.
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Further, to include acts such as stalking20 9 and extortion 210 in the list of
"crimes of violence" suggests that "crimes of violence" encompass those
acts that could likely result in bodily harm to another. It is reasonable that
the act of failing to supervise young children-after previous arrests for
similar neglectful acts-thus exposing them to danger fits in with other
"crimes of violence" that can be committed without physical force. For
instance, stalking can be committed without even the threat of physical
force.211 Like stalking, extortion is enumerated as a crime of violence, but
it also can be committed without the threat of physical force.212
A careful review of the Legislature's list of "crimes of violence"
reveals that the requirement of physical force or threat of physical force
can be met in a figurative sense or even in cases of neglect, as in second-
degree cruelty to juveniles, stalking, extortion, and, by extension, cruelty to
juveniles. The Legislature's inclusion of second-degree cruelty to
juveniles-which can be committed by failing to supervise-in the list of
"crimes of violence" seems to clearly indicate that a crime committed by an
act of neglect leading to bodily harm can be a "crime of violence" under
the Legislature's definition. The fact that the list is "merely illustrative, not
exhaustive," makes it even more probable that cruelty to juveniles-even
when committed by an act of neglect-fits in as a "crime[ ] of violence,"
thus making a second-degree murder conviction appropriate under the
facts of this case.2 13
C. Imposing Serious Criminal Responsibility for Deaths Resulting From
a Defendant's Failure to Act is Not Unprecedented
The majority refused to hold Small criminally responsible for murder
under the felony murder rule by finding that failing to supervise her chil-
dren did not constitute the "direct act" of killing required to elevate this
homicide to a murder.21 4 However, the general introductory provisions of
Louisiana's Criminal Code impose criminal responsibility for the results of
failing to act.215 While it appears that criminal responsibility for child
deaths occurring when a parent fails to supervise has not been specifically
addressed in Louisiana jurisprudence, Louisiana's own definition of crimi-
nal acts, along with criminal law scholarship, suggest that the proposition is
not as far-fetched as the majority claims.
First, Louisiana's own definition of criminal conduct includes "fail-
ure[s] to act that produce[] criminal consequences. '216 Criminal conse-
quences are a "set of consequences prescribed in the . . [Criminal]
209. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2.
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:66.
211. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(A).
212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:66(2)-(4).
213. See State v. Oliphant, 2012-1176 (La. 3/19/13); 113 So. 3d 165, 170.
214. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 809-11.
215. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:7 et seq.
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:8(1)-(2).
20151
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Code. . . as necessary to constitute any of the crimes defined therein. 217
Read together, these statutes show that a defendant's failure to act that
produces a result in which the Legislature has deemed a criminal conse-
quence by statute is a crime for which the defendant can be held criminally
responsible. A common thread throughout these introductory articles to
the Louisiana Criminal Code is the notion that criminal acts, consequences,
and penalties are dictated by the Legislature. The Legislature's addition of
cruelty to juveniles to Louisiana's felony murder statute, which should al-
low for a murder prosecution for a parent's failure to supervise, seems to
align perfectly with the above statutory definitions of criminal conduct and
criminal consequences. Not only is it in line with Louisiana's own Criminal
Code, but noted scholars of criminal law as well as the Model Penal Code
also permit imposing serious criminal consequences for failure to supervise.
LaFave's analysis, outlined above, makes sense in the context of crimi-
nal homicide, especially when viewed in light of the parent-child relation-
ship-like Small's relationship to her daughter. Applied to Small, this
analysis would almost certainly allow Small to be held criminally responsi-
ble under the Legislature's definition of felony murder in Louisiana's
Criminal Code. As Small was S.S.'s mother, there was likely a legally suffi-
cient relationship to give rise to Small's duty to supervise. Small certainly
knew that she had a duty to supervise, as she explicitly acknowledged the
duty and potential consequences of failing to perform her duty to supervise
to the court in her guilty plea on the previous abandonment charge. 18 As
Justice Guidry pointed out in his dissenting opinion, Louisiana jurispru-
dence provides that "sufficient causation" is shown when the defendant's
conduct is a "contributing cause or substantial factor" in bringing about the
killing when the killing is "reasonably foreseeable." '19 Guidry correctly
observed that it is reasonably foreseeable that a small child can fall victim
to serious harm when left unsupervised in a home.22 ° Small's failure to
supervise her children that night was at least a "contributing cause" and
"substantial factor" in her child's death because her supervision would
have allowed her to either extinguish the slow-burning fire or evacuate her
children, likely avoiding death or serious injury.2 21 Further, S.S.'s death
was "reasonably foreseeable" because a parent should know that a small
child's inability to extinguish or escape a house fire is a possibility when the
children are not supervised. 22 2 Thus, Small's second-degree murder convic-
tion based on her failure to supervise is appropriate under LaFave's analy-
sis of when a defendant's failure to act can constitute a criminal
homicide.223
217. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:9.
218. Small, 100 So. 3d at 800.
219. Id. at 816-17 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 813.
222. Id. at 817 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
223. Justice Guidry did not specifically mention LaFave's treatise in his analysis of the case, but
his approach appears to be substantially similar to that discussed in LaFave.
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Similarly, the Model Penal Code approach also warrants affirming the
lower courts' determinations that Small's failure to supervise her children
can serve as a basis for a second-degree murder prosecution.224 Small was
certainly able to perform the act omitted, supervising her children, because
it could have been accomplished simply by choosing to stay home with her
children rather than abandoning them in the apartment while she went
drinking with a friend. However, the Model Penal Code does not allow the
imposition of criminal liability for failing to act even if the defendant was
physically capable of performing the omitted act unless the "the omission is
made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or a duty to perform the
omitted act is otherwise imposed by the law. '225 In this case, Small's fail-
ure to supervise was "made sufficient by the law defining the offense"
when the Legislature added cruelty to juveniles to Louisiana's felony mur-
der statute, thus making an adult liable for murder if a child dies when the
adult commits an offense constituting cruelty to juveniles.2 6 The cruelty to
juveniles statute has been held to encompass acts of neglect and failure to
supervise. Therefore, by allowing cruelty to juveniles to be an underlying
felony in Louisiana's felony murder statute, the Legislature made failing to
supervise children sufficient to constitute murder in the "law defining the
offense" when the child dies as a result of the parent's failure to supervise.
Under either Lafave's approach or the Model Penal Code approach,
Small's second-degree murder conviction based on her failure to supervise
her children was appropriate. In addition to the court's erroneous applica-
tion of the agency limitation to the felony murder rule, the court failed to
recognize the Legislature's authority to make a felony murder prosecution
appropriate when the underlying felony is cruelty to juveniles committed
by failure to supervise.
D. The Legislature Has the Discretion to Designate Cruelty to Juveniles
as an Underlying Felony in a Felony Murder Prosecution
By overturning the verdict in this case and determining that Small was
guilty of negligent homicide and not second-degree murder,2 7 the court
effectively undermined the Legislature's authority to define what consti-
tutes criminal activity. The court's majority opinion recognized the "legis-
lature's prerogative to allow for a prosecution for second degree murder by
including cruelty to juveniles based on criminal neglect as an underlying
predicate felony., 228 However, in the majority opinion's conclusion, the
court stated that including "lack of supervision as the underlying felony" is
inconsistent with the Legislature's "classification of second-degree murder
as a crime of violence. ' 229 The majority found that the Legislature must
224. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (West 2013).
225. Id.
226. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A)(2) (2014).
227. Small, 100 So. 3d at 810.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 815.
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not have "intended to expand second degree murder to a case such as this,"
and that the rule of lenity should be applied. 3°
The majority unnecessarily construed the felony murder statute to
reach its finding that a parent's failure to supervise her children could not
support a second-degree murder conviction when a child died while outside
the parent's supervision. The court held previously in State v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. that construing criminal statutes is not necessary when
its "language... is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite
meaning .... ,131 The Legislature could not have been clearer when it
amended the felony murder statute in 1997 to include cruelty to juveniles.
There is no indication that the Legislature intended to impose any limita-
tion to the application of the felony murder rule in child abuse death cases
when it included cruelty to juveniles in the list of enumerated felonies in
the felony murder statute.
Even if the felony murder statute needed to be construed, the majority
did not show sufficient legislative intent to justify its ruling. Criminal stat-
utes are "subject to strict interpretation. 23 2 Certainly, this prosecution is
one within the State v. Gyles definition of strict statutory interpretation.233
Thus, prosecuting Small for second-degree murder under the felony mur-
der statute based on her failure to supervise fits the cruelty to juveniles
statute and is "within the clear and unmistakable import of [the statute's]
language" because the Legislature expressly allowed a felony murder pros-
ecution for a parent's failure to supervise when it added cruelty to juveniles
to the felony murder statute without limitation or condition.2 34 That is, the
Legislature did not limit murder liability by providing that cruelty to
juveniles can be a basis for felony murder only when the cruelty is commit-
ted by an affirmative act and not acts of neglect or failure to supervise.
Further, while courts are bound to interpret criminal statutes strictly, courts
may also interpret them in light of any legislative history and any applica-
ble revision comments.2 35 The Small court cited to no such authority, but
merely determined on its own that Small's habit of leaving her young chil-
dren unattended is not behavior that is consistent with second-degree mur-
der's classification as a "crime of violence" when that neglect leads to a
child's death.2 36 Louisiana's felony murder statute is sufficiently clear and
it should not have been construed by the court. Thus, the court's reliance
on the rule of lenity to find Small guilty of the lesser offense of negligent
homicide was also erroneous because the statute, along with the general
principles of criminal responsibility within Louisiana's Criminal Code,
clearly and unambiguously permit a felony murder prosecution for a death
230. Id.
231. State v. Ark. La. Gas. Co., 78 So. 2d 825, 827 (La. 1955).
232. Id.
233. State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799, 802 (La. 1975).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So. 3d 797, 815.
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resulting from cruelty to juveniles when it is committed by a parent's fail-
ure to supervise her child.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the Small decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored the au-
thority of the Louisiana Legislature to define crimes and prescribe criminal
penalties. As discussed above, the court has effectively limited the penalty
for an adult whose willful failure to supervise results in a child's death to a
mere five years in prison.237 The contrast in this penalty and the
mandatory life term accompanying a felony murder conviction is stark.238
The Louisiana Supreme Court has relied on distinguishable precedent and
a strained reading of Louisiana's negligent homicide statute to justify its
problematic decision in this case. Limiting the penalty for such offenses to
a mere five years does little to caution parents, guardians, and other adults
that being irresponsible with a child is not to be taken lightly. In fact, the
court's decision sends a message to Louisiana citizens that even repeated
instances of neglect that eventually end a child's life will result only in a
proverbial slap on the wrist.
237. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:32(C)(1) (2014).
238. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1.
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